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Abstract  1 
Voluntary incentive programs are widely used to generate conservation actions on private 2 
land. Although there is a growing body of research about factors that influence landholder 3 
participation in incentive programs, studies generally conceptualise landholders in 4 
agricultural landscapes as owner-occupier, farming individuals or families. Few studies have 5 
considered participation by absentee landholders and fewer still have recognised group 6 
landholders (e.g. non-government organisations or community groups) as potential incentive 7 
program participants. We examined participation in a conservation stewardship tender 8 
(reverse auction) in South Australia to identify the diversity within participants, and 9 
particularly to evaluate the extent of participation by absentee landholders and groups. A 10 
diverse set of landholders participated, where nearly a quarter of participants were absentee 11 
landholders, and a small component were groups. Although small in number, groups were 12 
shown to be important because they were likely to offer larger land areas in the stewardship 13 
tender. With very little known about how absentee and group landholders may differ from 14 
their counterparts, further research is recommended to inform incentive program design. We 15 
recommend that incentive programs consider landholder diversity in order to achieve 16 
effective conservation in agricultural landscapes. 17 
 18 
Keywords: stewardship; covenant; auction; native vegetation; Bayesian 19 
Model Averaging 20 
1. Introduction 21 
At the global scale, publicly governed protected areas are not sufficient to meet 22 
environmental targets on their own (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2016), leaving a significant 23 
contribution required from private landholders (Figgis, 2004; Knight, 1999; Norton, 2000). 24 
Consequently, private landholders have an important role to play in biodiversity conservation 25 
and the sustainable provision of other ecosystem services. The public good quality of 26 
biodiversity conservation and the implementation and opportunity costs of changing 27 
management mean that there are often cost barriers to optimal production of conservation 28 
benefits on private land (Kinzig et al., 2011). Offering payments to private landholders for 29 
environmental services through voluntary incentive programs is one approach widely 30 
employed to generate conservation action on private land (Doremus, 2003; Kamal et al., 31 
2015). However the drivers of participation can be complex and in many cases remain 32 
insufficiently known (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Sorice and Donlan, 2015). 33 
When participation in incentive programs is voluntary, the environmental outcomes of 34 
the program rely on appropriate levels of participation (Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Rolfe et 35 
al., 2017; Selinske et al., 2015; Zanella et al., 2014). Positive environmental outcomes are 36 
dependent on sufficient participation from landholders responsible for the assets of interest. 37 
However, high participation is not always desirable. In programs with a finite budget where 38 
participants compete for funds, interest in participation may extend far beyond the available 39 
budget, resulting in avoidable transaction costs and inefficiencies for the program and 40 
participants (Whitten et al., 2013). Knowledge of the target audience, and the factors that 41 
influence their participation, is therefore required to inform the design of effective incentive 42 
programs (Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 2012; Rolfe et al., 2017; Whitten et 43 
al., 2013). 44 
While the level of incentives offered is a key factor, there are many other factors that 45 
influence participation in incentive programs. These include characteristics of the potential 46 
participants themselves, their landholdings, their attitudes and behaviour and the social 47 
context (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Morrison et al., 2012). Research in this area commonly 48 
examines factors such as participant age, education level and experience (e.g. Comerford, 49 
2014; Pavlis et al., 2016) and dependence on the land or associated resources (e.g. Lindhjem 50 
and Mitani, 2012; Petrzelka et al., 2012). Social factors such as trust, connectedness and 51 
access to information (e.g. Moon, 2013; Morrison et al., 2012; Zanella et al., 2014) and 52 
attitudes and behaviour including personal satisfaction from participation, agreement with the 53 
incentive program goals, business orientation and information seeking behaviour (e.g. 54 
Comerford, 2014; Morrison et al., 2012; Pavlis et al., 2016; Reimer and Prokopy, 2014) are 55 
also frequently addressed. However, as Burton (2014) highlights, findings about the presence 56 
and direction of relationships between these factors and participation can be inconsistent or 57 
contradictory because the cause of the relationships often remain poorly understood. Another 58 
limitation of this area of research is that studies of environmental behaviour in agricultural 59 
landscapes almost always conceptualise landholders as owner-occupier farming individuals 60 
or families, in empirical studies and reviews (e.g. Burton, 2014; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Hill 61 
et al., 2011; Perkins et al., 2013) and in economic choice experiments (e.g. Boxall et al., 62 
2017; Wichmann et al., 2016). Exceptions to this prevailing view are a small number of 63 
studies that have considered absentee landholders (e.g.Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012; Petrzelka 64 
and Armstrong, 2015; Petrzelka et al., 2013; Petrzelka et al., 2012; Ulrich-Schad et al., 2016).  65 
In many places, rural land ownership is becoming increasingly diverse, with growing 66 
numbers of non-primary producer “amenity migrants” (Cooke and Lane, 2015; Gosnell and 67 
Abrams, 2011) and absentee landholders (Mendham and Curtis, 2010; Petrzelka et al., 2013). 68 
While the influence of land use on participation has been addressed by many studies, only a 69 
small number of these have examined participation by absentee landholders. Studies of 70 
absentee landholder participation indicate that absentee landholders may be less concerned 71 
with financial incentives for land management change (Farmer et al., 2015), or accept lower 72 
incentives compared with resident owners (Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012), and that access to 73 
information can be a key barrier to participation (Petrzelka et al., 2012; Ulrich-Schad et al., 74 
2016). Another contribution to the diversity of participants in conservation on private land is 75 
made by group landholders such as community groups, not-for-profit conservation 76 
organisations, and corporations (Fitzsimons, 2015; Gosnell and Travis, 2005; Selinske et al., 77 
2015). To our knowledge, information about group landholders as participants in 78 
conservation incentive programs has not been directly examined in the literature. 79 
This study aims to investigate the diversity in incentive program participants, and in 80 
particular, to identify the role of absentee landholders and groups. We took a novel approach 81 
to the characterisation of participants in a conservation stewardship program in South 82 
Australia where incentives were allocated by tender (a reverse, single-sealed-bid auction). 83 
We examined a range of participant characteristics including their involvement in primary 84 
production, whether they are resident or absentee and whether they participated as an 85 
individual/family or group. Statistical models were used to test the relationships between 86 
these factors and the size of the area offered in the tender. Results are discussed in the context 87 
of incentive program design to promote conservation on private land.  88 
2. Materials and methods 89 
To investigate the question of which landholders participate in conservation incentive 90 
programs we used the BushBids conservation stewardship program as a case study. This 91 
program had 163 unique participants and spanned a large geographic area (more than 30,000 92 
km2) in the agricultural regions to the east of Adelaide, South Australia. Average annual 93 
rainfall in the program area ranged from approximately 880 mm in the wettest part of the Mt 94 
Lofty Ranges to approximately 210 mm in the arid plains to the north of the River Murray 95 
(BOM, 2014). Agricultural activities in the program area included broad-acre cropping 96 
(cereals, pulses, oilseed), hay and silage production, horticulture, viticulture, livestock 97 
grazing, and intensive livestock production (ABS, 2016). The program area’s native 98 
vegetation was diverse, primarily including eucalypt dominated forests, woodlands, and 99 
mallee, as well as grasslands, wetlands, and chenopod shrublands (DEWNR, 2011). 100 
 101 
2.1. BushBids conservation stewardship program 102 
The work presented here is based on the BushBids program (Australian Government, 103 
2006). The aim of this program was to support private landholders to maintain or restore the 104 
ecological function of remnant native vegetation on their property. Briefly, private 105 
landholders were invited to tender (bid) for 5 or 10 year contracts to manage and restore 106 
native vegetation. Over the period from 2006 to 2013, there were five BushBids projects with 107 
a total of eight tender rounds (Table 1). The projects were advertised through a variety of 108 
channels: local newspapers and newsletters; local radio and television; agricultural field days; 109 
and government and non-government organisation natural resources management networks. 110 
Participation was voluntary and landholders were not obliged to bid in the tender, or accept 111 
the contract if their bid was successful. After the landholder made an expression of interest, 112 
an on-site assessment of the location, size and condition of the native vegetation on their 113 
property was made by BushBids, and a native vegetation management plan was prepared for 114 
the landholder (O’Connor et al., 2014). Management plans mapped the area of native 115 
vegetation offered in the project and outlined management actions designed to maintain or 116 
improve the condition or ecological function of the native vegetation. Management of grazing 117 
pressure from stock and retaining fallen timber were mandatory, and always included in the 118 
management plan, while weed control and feral animal control were usually included and 119 
revegetation was occasionally included. 120 
At a broad level, management plans were consistent throughout all five BushBids 121 
projects, however, the extent to which management actions differed from existing practices 122 
depended on participant circumstances. Management of stock grazing pressure under a 123 
BushBids management plan required complete stock exclusion from the site in most cases, 124 
but a conservative stock grazing regime was allowed in grassy ecosystems where it was used 125 
as a management tool to maintain or restore ecological function. For some participants this 126 
represented a change in management with associated forgone resources, while for participants 127 
who had already excluded stock or were already using conservative grazing practices in 128 
grassy ecosystems, there was no or minimal change required. Weed species and feral animal 129 
species targeted for control also differed between project locations and to a lesser extent, 130 
within project locations according to variation in climate and other environmental conditions. 131 
The management actions were intended to maintain or restore ecological function in remnant 132 
vegetation in order to address past and continuing declines identified by Duncan and 133 
Dorrough (2009) and Perring et al. (2015) for example. However, the ecological outcomes of 134 
these restoration actions have not yet been documented in research literature.    135 
 136 
2.2. BushBids project locations 137 
The five BushBids projects were located in the Mt Lofty Ranges, Murray-Darling 138 
Basin and South East regions of South Australia, where much of the original native 139 
vegetation has been cleared to provide land for agriculture (Fig. 1). Native vegetation cover 140 
in the project locations ranged from 8 % in the Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR) project to 141 
61 % in the Woodland (WLND) and River Bend (RBND) projects (Table 2). In addition to 142 
having the smallest proportion of remaining native vegetation, the EMLR project location 143 
had one of the smallest proportions of native vegetation protected in public protected areas 144 
(4 %) and the highest proportion of residential land (21 %). The WLND project location had 145 
the next largest proportion of residential land (7 %) and although it had a large proportion of 146 
remnant vegetation, only 7 % was protected by covenants (similar to conservation easements) 147 
on private land and only 3 % was in public protected areas. The RBND location, also with a 148 
large proportion of remnant native vegetation, had similar levels of protected vegetation to 149 
the WLND location, but a smaller proportion of residential land (3 %) and a larger proportion 150 
of land used for primary production (87 %). The Southern Mallee (SMLE) project location 151 
had the largest proportion of land used for primary production (96 %) and small proportions 152 
of remnant native vegetation (9 %) and residential land (1 %). Like the SMLE location, the 153 
South Eastern (SEAST) project location had a very small proportion of residential land, 154 
however this location had a moderate proportion of remnant native vegetation (22 %), much 155 
of which was protected by covenants (16 %) and in public protected areas (59 %).  156 
 157 
2.3. Data 158 
Data about participants and their native vegetation were collected by the BushBids 159 
program through the expression of interest and site assessment processes. A subset of these 160 
data was made available for this study, including the size of the area offered for management 161 
at the draft management plan stage (referred to here as management plan size), the presence 162 
of proposed and existing covenants (similar to conservation easements), gender of the 163 
primary contact person/people, town of postal address and nearest town to the property, entity 164 
type, and information about the participant’s involvement in primary production. This 165 
information was used to generate a set of eight categorical variables and one numerical 166 
variable characterising participants. The categorical variables were selected to provide 167 
information about the diversity of participants. Entity type, absentee status and primary 168 
production status were selected to evaluate the extent to which participants diverged from 169 
owner occupier, farming individuals or families. Gender of primary contact was included 170 
firstly to identify the extent of gender diversity in participants and secondly to evaluate how 171 
the other variables related to this fundamental demographic diversity measure. Although it’s 172 
been shown that in developed economies women are more likely than men to engage in pro 173 
environmental behaviour (Hunter et al., 2004; Raymond and Brown, 2011), in this study, this 174 
trend is likely to be hidden by the gender imbalance in management and ownership of rural 175 
land noted by Raymond and Brown (2011). Three covenant (conservation easement) status 176 
variables were included to allow evaluation of how permanent covenants may interact with 177 
participation in the stewardship tender. Finally, the project location variable was included to 178 
allow evaluation of how the other participant characteristics varied with location. 179 
Entity type includes two categories: individual/family and group. The 180 
individual/family category includes individuals or family groups where all members were 181 
connected by a familial relationship. All remaining participants shared a common 182 
characteristic in that they were groups where not all group members shared a familial 183 
relationship. This group category comprises a broad spectrum of participants including 184 
community groups, non-government organisations and corporations (other than family 185 
business structures), and also extends to include local government and informal groups where 186 
two or more group members were co-owners or co-managers with no familial relationship. 187 
The absentee or resident variable was generated using information about the nearest 188 
town to the land offered for management and the town of the participant’s postal address. 189 
Where the town nearest the land offered for management and the town of the postal address 190 
of the participant matched or were proximate, the participant was classified as resident. If the 191 
town nearest to the land offered for management and the town of the participant’s postal 192 
address were spatially distant then the participant was classified as absentee. For example, 193 
these cases included participants who resided in Adelaide (or a major regional centre) but 194 
offered management services on a rural property. Some of the absentee participants resided 195 
on rural properties but offered management services on rural property in a different location. 196 
Where a participant offered land for management from two or more properties and met the 197 
criteria for being resident at one property the participant was classified as resident.  198 
The gender of the primary contact was derived from the contact names participants 199 
gave when expressing interest in BushBids, and for the site assessment and development of 200 
the management plan. A number of participants provided contact names for more than one 201 
person and where male and female contact names were given this was classified as “both” 202 
rather than male or female. 203 
The primary production status was assessed using a range of information collected by 204 
BushBids. This information included direct observations made by BushBids personnel, 205 
satellite imagery of the areas adjacent to the native vegetation and participant reported land 206 
use. If there was any primary production activity undertaken by the participant or by another 207 
party on the participant’s property, then the participant was classified as a primary producer. 208 
Primary production activity included livestock, cropping, orchards and vineyards. Keeping 209 
horses for recreation and small scale, domestic gardening or poultry keeping were not 210 
classified as primary production activity. A small number of participants (six) could not be 211 
classified using the available information. 212 
The project location was also included as a categorical variable. As some participants 213 
were involved in more than one BushBids project, participants were classified according to 214 
the BushBids project where their bid was successful, or if they did not make a successful bid, 215 
they were allocated to the first BushBids project they participated in. 216 
The covenant variables categorise participants according to the presence or absence of 217 
existing and proposed covenants in their BushBids management plan. The covenants referred 218 
to in this study are similar to conservation easements in the USA (e.g. Fishburn et al., 2009), 219 
in that they are binding agreements established to conserve environmental values on private 220 
land. This study exclusively deals with Native Vegetation Heritage Agreements, a form of 221 
covenant in South Australia (Adams and Moon, 2013). Native Vegetation Heritage 222 
Agreements establish legally prescribed, usually permanent land use restrictions on a piece of 223 
land, with the agreement registered on the land title (Native Vegetation Act, 1991). Land use 224 
restrictions under Native Vegetation Heritage Agreements include restrictions on clearance or 225 
removal of native flora and fauna, introduction of non-native organisms and fertiliser, and 226 
removal or disturbance of soil and rock (Native Vegetation Council, 2017). They are 227 
generally consistent regardless of location and ecosystem type, with some relatively rare 228 
exceptions for stock grazing in grassy ecosystems (where it is used as a tool for conservation) 229 
and in the Monarto area where a specific type of Heritage Agreement was historically 230 
established with lower level restrictions. These variations in restrictions are unlikely to affect 231 
many of the participants and therefore have not been addressed in the analysis. The three 232 
covenant variables used in this study; existing covenant, proposed covenant and existing 233 
and/or proposed covenant were created from information about the presence of existing and 234 
proposed Native Vegetation Heritage Agreements within the management plans negotiated 235 
with participants. Where a Native Vegetation Heritage Agreement application had been 236 
submitted prior to participation in BushBids but the agreement had not yet been established, 237 
this was treated as an existing covenant. 238 
The numerical variable management plan size was the total size of the area offered by 239 
the landholder for BushBids at the draft management plan stage, regardless of whether or not 240 
the landholder submitted a bid. Where the landholder participated in multiple BushBids 241 
projects and/or tender rounds, the total area offered by that landholder across all projects and 242 
rounds was used. 243 
 244 
2.4. Data analysis 245 
The Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence with Yates’ Continuity Correction was 246 
used to test whether absentee landholders and covenants were associated with primary 247 
production status. Observations from the unclassified category for primary production status 248 
were excluded from this analysis due to the small number of observations in this category. 249 
All expected frequencies were greater than five. 250 
Ward’s hierarchical cluster analysis was undertaken to identify groups within the 251 
participants. This method provided a relatively high cophenetic correlation coefficient (0.63) 252 
compared with other hierarchical cluster analysis methods and provided an interpretable 253 
solution with four groups, each containing a sufficient number of observations. A 254 
dissimilarity matrix was created for the cluster analysis using Gower’s metric due to this 255 
metric’s suitability for categorical variables. The dissimilarity matrix used a subset of the 256 
data: entity, gender of primary contact, primary production status, resident/absentee status 257 
and status for new and existing covenants separately. Observations in the “unclassified” 258 
category for primary production status were excluded due to the small number of 259 
observations in this category.  260 
Linear modelling was used to test the relationship between management plan size and 261 
the predictor variables entity type, primary production status, absentee status, covenant status 262 
and gender of primary contact. The management plan size variable was natural log 263 
transformed to meet assumptions of normality, and observations with “unclassified” primary 264 
production status were removed from the dataset. A linear model of the main effects was 265 
fitted and tested with ANOVA both by adding terms to the model and dropping terms from 266 
the model. These two approaches yielded slightly different results, however, we selected the 267 
more conservative results from the additive approach for presentation here. 268 
Generalized Linear Modelling with Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) (Hoeting et 269 
al., 1999) was then used to confirm the results from the linear model and examine the 270 
relationship of management plan size to predictor variables within each of the four largest 271 
projects. BMA calculates an average of multiple model predictions, weighted by the posterior 272 
model probabilities. When a predictor variable had a 0.75 or greater probability of inclusion 273 
in the model, it was considered to be an important predictor (Thomson et al., 2007; Viallefont 274 
et al., 2001).   275 
All statistical analyses were performed using R 3.2.4. The Gower’s dissimilarity 276 
matrix was created using the package cluster 2.0.5 (Maechler et al., 2016), while the package 277 
BMA 3.18.6 (Raftery et al., 2015) was used for Bayesian Model Averaging.  278 
3. Results 279 
3.1. Participants 280 
Of the 163 participants, a large majority were individuals or families (92 %) with the 281 
remainder consisting of groups (8 %). The gender of the primary contact person was most 282 
frequently male (60 %), although a considerable proportion of primary contacts were female 283 
(20 %) or included at least one person of each gender (20 %).   284 
A little over half the participants were involved in some kind of primary production 285 
(55 %), while approximately 41 % were not involved in primary production and a small 286 
number (4 %) could not be classified (Fig. 2(a-d)). At the time of expressing interest in the 287 
program, most participants were resident on their property (77 %), however, a considerable 288 
proportion were not (23 %) (Fig. 2(a)). Thirty four per cent of participants had an existing 289 
covenant (similar to a conservation easement) over part or all of the land offered in BushBids 290 
(Fig. 2(c)) and 25 % of participants indicated they would like to apply for a covenant 291 
(Fig. 2(d)). Almost half of the participants (44 %) did not have a covenant over the land 292 
offered in the project and were not proposing to apply for one as part of their offered 293 
management services (Fig. 2(b)). 294 
The Chi-squared independence test revealed that resident/absentee status was 295 
dependent on primary production status (Chi-square independence test X2=23.4, df=1, 296 
P<0.0001) with a larger proportion of absentee landholders within those not involved in 297 
primary production, compared with those landholders who were involved in primary 298 
production (Fig. 2(a)). However, no significant relationship was found between covenants 299 
and primary production status (X2=1.6, df=1, P=0.2) (Fig. 2(b)). 300 
Four groups of participants were identified through hierarchical cluster analysis and 301 
are here after referred to as clusters (Fig. 3(a-d)). Cluster 1 was the largest and included 45 % 302 
of all participants. It mainly comprised participants who were classed as individuals or 303 
families (94 % of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(a)), resident (85 % of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(b)), and involved 304 
in primary production (65 % of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(c)). Nearly all participants in this cluster 305 
did not have an existing covenant (97 % of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(d)) and did not have a proposed 306 
covenant (99 % of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(f)). The next largest cluster, Cluster 2, included 23 % of 307 
total participants and was comprised entirely of individuals or families (Fig. 3(a)) with a 308 
proposed covenant (Fig. 3(f)). This cluster had relatively similar proportions of primary 309 
producers (56 % of Cluster 2) and non-primary producers (44 % of Cluster 2) (Fig. 3(c)), a 310 
relatively large proportion of absentee landholders (25 % of Cluster 2) (Fig. 3(b)) and the 311 
largest proportion of female primary contacts (42 % of Cluster 2) (Fig. 3(e)) compared with 312 
the other clusters. Cluster 3 included 17 % of all participants and was comprised exclusively 313 
of participants who were not involved in primary production (Fig. 3(c)) and also had a large 314 
component of absentee landholders (65 % of Cluster 3) (Fig. 3(b)), groups (31 % of Cluster 315 
3) (Fig. 3(c)) and participants with an existing covenant (92 % of Cluster 3) (Fig. 3(d)). 316 
Finally, Cluster 4 was the smallest cluster and included 15 % of all participants. Similar to 317 
cluster 1, cluster 4 was comprised entirely of participants who were resident (Fig. 3(a)), 318 
involved in primary production (Fig. 3(c)) and not proposing a new covenant (Fig. 3(f)). 319 
However unlike cluster 1, all members of the cluster 4 had an existing covenant (Fig. 3(d)). 320 
 321 
3.1.1. Absentee landholders 322 
A majority of participating absentee landholders were non-primary producers (76 % 323 
of 38 absentee participants) compared with 21 % who were primary producers (Fig. 2(a)). 324 
Likewise, more absentee participants were individuals/families (82 % of absentee 325 
participants) than were groups (18 % of absentee participants). The WLND project location 326 
had the highest percentage of absentee participants (34 % of participants in that project) 327 
followed by the EMLR project where 29 % of participants were absentee and the RBND 328 
project where 26 % of participants were absentee (Fig. 4(a)). The SMLE and SEAST projects 329 
both had lower rates of absentee participants with 11 % and 9 % respectively. 330 
 331 
3.1.2. Groups 332 
Following a similar pattern as the absentee participants, most participating groups 333 
were non-primary producers (77 % of 13 participating groups), with the remaining 23 % 334 
being classified as primary producers. There was a roughly even division between absentee 335 
(seven) and resident (six) participants within those classified as groups. Project locations with 336 
the highest proportions of participating groups were the RBND project where 13 % of 337 
participants were groups, and both the EMLR and WLND projects where 9 % of participants 338 
were groups (Fig. 4(b)). The SMLE project had no participating groups, while 5 % of 339 
participants in the SEAST project were groups. 340 
 341 
3.2. Management plan size 342 
The size of the area offered by participants in the tenders (referred to here as 343 
management plan size) differed by four orders of magnitude ranging from 0.5 ha to 344 
4 792.6 ha, with a median of 45.7 ha and interquartile range of 19.0 ha to 179.6 ha. Linear 345 
modelling showed a significant relationship between management plan size and both project 346 
location and entity type (see Table 3 and Sup. 1). Other participant characteristics (primary 347 
production status, covenant status, gender of primary contact and resident/absentee status) 348 
were not significantly related to management plan size. 349 
Generalised linear modelling with Bayesian model averaging confirmed the 350 
relationship between management plan size and project location and entity type with these 351 
factors identified as the strongest predictors of management plan size, and the only predictors 352 
with greater than 75 % chance of inclusion in the model for all project locations combined 353 
(Table 4). Entities classified as individuals or families were likely to have smaller 354 
management plans (coefficient of -1.14) than entities classified as groups. Compared with 355 
EMLR, participants in all other project locations were likely to have larger management plans 356 
(coefficients ranging from 0.97 to 2.00). The SEAST project location was the only individual 357 
location where predictors with a greater than 75 % chance of inclusion were identified (Table 358 
4). These predictors were entity type, gender of primary contact, primary production status 359 
and covenant status. Again, participants classified as individuals or families were likely to 360 
have smaller management plans than group participants. In the SEAST location, participants 361 
with female-only primary contacts were likely to have smaller management plans than 362 
participants with primary contacts that included both genders. Non-primary producers were 363 
likely to have smaller management plans than primary producers and participants with neither 364 
existing nor proposed covenants were likely to have smaller management plans than those 365 
with covenants or proposed covenants.  366 
4. Discussion 367 
In this study we characterised participants in a conservation stewardship tender 368 
(reverse auction) and examined how these characteristics related to the size of the area 369 
offered in the tender. The range of landholders interested in participating was diverse, 370 
including a considerable proportion of absentee landholders, a small but important constituent 371 
of groups and relatively equal proportions of primary producers and non-primary producers. 372 
Project location was the best predictor of the size of the area offered in the tender followed by 373 
entity type, with groups likely to offer larger areas compared with individuals and families. 374 
The diversity of landholders participating in the tender is consistent with the increasing 375 
diversity within agricultural landscapes highlighted by Mendham and Curtis (2010). Both 376 
absentee landholders and groups were found to be important participants, absentee 377 
landholders because they made up a considerable proportion of total participants and groups 378 
because of the larger areas they offered in the tender. Programs seeking to incentivise 379 
conservation actions on private land must understand these ownership structures, particularly 380 
where they result in participant behavioural differences compared with traditional, production 381 
oriented, family ownership models. 382 
 383 
4.1. Absentee landholders 384 
Absentee landholders made up nearly a quarter of all participants and came from all 385 
project locations. This large component of absentee landholders confirms their relevance 386 
within the community of private land managers in agricultural landscapes and aligns with 387 
studies showing increasing absentee ownership in various parts of the world (Petrzelka et al., 388 
2013) including Australia (Klepeis et al., 2009; Mendham and Curtis, 2010). Further, these 389 
results provide empirical evidence of absentee landholders’ interest in participating in a 390 
conservation stewardship tender, which to our knowledge has not previously been 391 
documented. Project locations with the highest rates of absentee landholder participation 392 
were the EMLR project location where much of the area is within 50 km of Adelaide (the 393 
nearest city) and the WLND and RBND project locations where the majority of the area is 394 
within 150 km of Adelaide and there is a relatively large proportion of native vegetation 395 
remaining in the landscape. Travel distance from cities is likely to influence the rates of 396 
absentee land ownership, at least for non-primary producing landholders, however other 397 
interrelated factors may also play a role such as amenity values, land productivity and value, 398 
and land use planning and policy. Although there is a substantial body of research relating to 399 
amenity migrants (Gosnell and Abrams, 2011), relatively little is known about absentee 400 
landholders. More research is needed to better understand the patterns and drivers of absentee 401 
ownership and how rates of absentee landholder participation in incentive programs compare 402 
with rates of absentee land ownership in agricultural landscapes. 403 
Participating absentee landholders included both primary producers and non-primary 404 
producers, with most classed as non-primary producers. Absentee primary producers may 405 
have included landholders who own two or more spatially separated rural properties to take 406 
advantage of resources available in different environments (e.g. seasonal grazing for stock 407 
while crops are grown on the primary property), or landholders who reside in an urban area 408 
and manage the property remotely. Non-primary producer absentee participants are likely to 409 
have included “weekenders” who reside in urban areas and periodically visit their rural 410 
properties for recreation and/or other purposes, or groups who jointly use and manage the 411 
land for a variety purposes (such as recreation, conservation and/or non-primary production 412 
businesses). Recreation has been found to be a widespread purpose for land ownership among 413 
absentee landholders and intersection of multiple land uses is also common (Petrzelka and 414 
Armstrong, 2015; Petrzelka et al., 2009). To facilitate participation by absentee landholders, 415 
private land conservation policy makers are advised to recognise that absenteeism may 416 
coincide with a variety of often co-existing land use objectives. 417 
Although they are a diverse group, absentee landholders may face some particular 418 
challenges for land management and incentive program participation that set them apart from 419 
resident landholders. Absentee landholders may not access the same information sources as 420 
resident landholders, therefore presenting a challenge for incentive program recruitment. 421 
Time constraints may also be a major barrier for absentee landholders, including at the time 422 
of recruitment to a program (Mendham et al., 2012), having insufficient time available to 423 
implement management actions (Kendra and Hull, 2005; Klepeis et al., 2009) or experiencing 424 
difficulties with the timing or frequency of visits required for management, such as 425 
implementing weed control at a critical weed lifecycle stage. The cost of implementing 426 
management actions may also be influenced by absentee status (Mendham et al., 2012). For 427 
example, there may be additional costs associated with travel and transport to the property 428 
and/or hired labour and equipment. However, absentee landholders’ possible willingness to 429 
accept lower incentive rates (Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012) may offset additional management 430 
costs. Another management challenge potentially exacerbated by absenteeism is impacts 431 
from unauthorised access to the property (O’Connor, 2016) for activities such as off road 432 
vehicle use, camping, hunting (Kendall et al., 2013) and timber theft (Petrzelka et al., 2013). 433 
Many of these barriers or challenges faced by absentee landholders can be addressed by 434 
incentive program design. For example, program recruitment methods can be designed to 435 
reach absentee landholders through the use of appropriate advertising messages (Morrison et 436 
al., 2017), advertising channels, and timing of recruitment events (Mendham and Curtis, 437 
2010). Absentee participation is also likely to be supported by programs that allow some 438 
flexibility in timing for engagement and implementation of management actions. Further 439 
research is needed to determine the extent to which issues affecting absentee landholders are 440 
addressed by incentive programs. 441 
 442 
4.2. Groups 443 
The number of group participants was relatively small, however the group entity type 444 
was positively related to management plan size. This highlights their importance as potential 445 
participants in incentive programs. Although groups have been acknowledged as managers in 446 
the private land conservation literature (Fitzsimons, 2015; Selinske et al., 2015) and in studies 447 
of landholders in agricultural landscapes (Gosnell and Travis, 2005), to our knowledge, they 448 
have not previously been considered in studies about participation in incentive programs. 449 
Participants classed as groups in this study included a wide range of group forms, from non-450 
government organisations to local government, corporations, community groups and small 451 
informal groups of individuals who co-own and/or co-manage remnant native vegetation. We 452 
acknowledge that this is a very broad spectrum and that motivations for participation in 453 
incentive programs and objectives for land management may vary considerably between 454 
groups, however, in this study, the small number of participating groups did not allow further 455 
classification at a finer scale. Further research is needed to identify group types along with 456 
their motivations and constraints for participation in conservation incentive programs. 457 
Despite the wide variation in types of groups, there may be some characteristics that group 458 
landholders share. For example, groups may require longer time periods for decision making, 459 
a need that could be accommodated in incentive program design. As current information 460 
relating to groups and their participation in incentive programs is very scarce, it is an 461 
important area for future research to inform policy. 462 
 463 
4.3. Covenants 464 
Landholders with and without existing covenants (conservation easements) 465 
participated in the conservation stewardship tender and some were interested in applying for 466 
a new covenant. The largest cluster of participants identified with hierarchical cluster analysis 467 
was characterised by participants who did not have an existing covenant and did not express 468 
interest in applying for one. This highlights a large constituency of participants who were not 469 
prepared to enter into an in-perpetuity covenant but were still willing to offer management 470 
services over a five or ten year period. Participants in this cluster were resident, primary 471 
producing individuals or families. Given that previous research indicates that participation is 472 
reduced when the program employs compulsory covenanting (Comerford, 2013), this large 473 
sector of landholders may have been dissuaded from participation if the program had made 474 
covenanting mandatory. 475 
The next largest cluster was characterised by landholders seeking a covenant and 476 
included both primary producers and non-primary producers as well as absentee and resident 477 
landholders. Therefore, there was a potential supply of covenants from both primary 478 
producers and non-primary producers and absentee and resident landholders. The final two 479 
clusters were characterised by participants who had an existing covenant and were not 480 
seeking an additional covenant. These clusters show that even with an existing covenant there 481 
is a perceived need for additional management cost recovery, that is, these landholders do not 482 
consider that a covenant on its own was sufficient to meet their management objectives. 483 
 484 
4.4. Management plan size 485 
Location and entity type were the only reliable predictors of management plan size 486 
when all project locations were considered together. This relationship between project 487 
location and management plan size is probably driven by differences in agricultural 488 
productivity, rainfall and proximity to the city of Adelaide and large rural centres, as well as 489 
associated differences in average land parcel size, property size and land value. Group 490 
entities were likely to include larger areas in their management plans than entities classified 491 
as individuals/families. This could be explained by the ability of groups to pool resources and 492 
therefore purchase and manage larger areas of land. It might also be a consequence of historic 493 
development patterns leaving some large areas of uncleared land with relatively low 494 
production value where buyers do not expect to recover their investment through production. 495 
With groups being more likely to offer larger areas of land in the incentive program, they 496 
may be seen as an important sector of participants to recruit. However, maximising the area 497 
of land offered by each participant or the total area offered in the incentive program may not 498 
always be desirable. For instance, an adequate number of participants is required to provide 499 
competition in a tender making it potentially undesirable to have a small number of 500 
participants offering large land areas, and there may also be significant transaction costs for 501 
each entrant meaning increasing participation beyond adequate levels is not justified by the 502 
total budget for incentive payments (Whitten et al., 2013). 503 
The SEAST project location was the only individual project with reliable predictors of 504 
management plan size. Here, group entities, primary producers and sites with an existing 505 
covenant were associated with larger management plan sizes, while having a female primary 506 
contact was associated with smaller management plan size. The relationship to primary 507 
production status may be due to the generally larger properties held by primary producers 508 
compared with non-primary producers (Mendham and Curtis, 2010), while the relationship to 509 
covenant status may be a consequence of previous government legislation (e.g.Upper South 510 
East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Act, 2002) and associated policy having 511 
already established covenants on many of the larger remnants in the project location.  512 
5. Conclusion 513 
This study challenges the notion that, in agricultural landscapes, landholders 514 
interested in conservation incentive programs are typically farming individuals or families. 515 
Using empirical evidence from a case study conservation tender program we have shown that 516 
participating landholders can be diverse in land use, residence distance from the property and 517 
land ownership structure. They may or may not use their property for primary production, 518 
they may be resident on the property or absentee and they may own the land individually or 519 
jointly as part of a group. Both absentee landholders and groups were important participants 520 
in the conservation program, absentee landholders due to their considerable numbers and 521 
groups because they were likely to offer larger land areas in the tender. 522 
Given the importance of absentee and group landholders revealed by this study, and 523 
the extremely limited information currently available regarding these landholder types, we 524 
recommend further research to address the following knowledge gaps. Firstly, research is 525 
needed to identify more specific group types within the broad category of group landholders 526 
and to investigate their motivations and constraints for participation. For absentee 527 
landholders, research is needed to further explore the drivers and patterns of absentee land 528 
ownership and to evaluate how rates of absentee landholder participation compare to rates of 529 
absentee land ownership. Finally, research is also needed to further examine the extent to 530 
which issues affecting absentee landholders, such as access to information, time constraints 531 
and unauthorised property access, are addressed by incentive programs. This knowledge will 532 
be valuable to inform future policy design for conservation incentive programs in agricultural 533 
landscapes.534 
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Table 1. BushBids conservation stewardship tenders 








Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR) 2 2006-07 5 or 10 55  
Woodland (WLND) 2 2010-11 5 32 
Riverbend (RBND) 1 2013 5 23 
Southern Mallee (SMLE) 1 2013 5 9 
South Eastern (SEAST) 2 2013 5 44 






km2 (%)a f 
Covenant 













EMLR 2 758 233 (8 %) 88 (38 %) 9 (4 %) 76 %  2 %  21 %  
WLND 5 878 3 581 (61 %) 245 (7 %) 120 (3 %) 81 % 10 % 7%  
RBND 5 787 3 509 (61 %) 735 (21 %) 105 (3 %) 87 % 10 % 3 %  
SMLE 6 964 618 (9 %) 162 (26 %) 44 (7 %) 96 % 1 % 1 %  
SEAST 27 899 6 092 (22 %) 961 (16 %) 3 600 (59 %) 84 % 14 % 1 %  
NB spatial statistics calculated using Geocentric Datum of Australia 1994 and Albers Equal Area projection in ArcGIS 10.4.1 
a Per cent of total area. b Per cent of native vegetation. c Per cent of total mapped land use (‘Primary production’ includes agriculture, 
horticulture, livestock grazing and forestry; ‘Reserve/vacant/recreation’ includes golf, reserve, recreation and vacant; and ‘Residential’ 
includes residential, rural residential, non-private residential and vacant residential). d Spatial data source (DEWNR, 2017). e Spatial 
data source (DEWNR, 2015). f Spatial data source (DEWNR, 2011). g Spatial data source (DPTI, 2016).
Table 3. Relationship of participant characteristics to management plan size 
















1 8.3245 0.0045**  
-1.2 ±0.4 
Gender of primary contact 
 
2 1.7511 0.1772  
Primary production status 
 
1 3.7677 0.0542    
 
Resident or absentee 
 
1 0.6255 0.4303    
Covenant status 
 
1 2.9944 0.0857    
Table 4. Probability of a non-zero coefficient P(inc), coefficients, Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and R2 for management plan 
size in all locations combined and in EMLR, SEAST, WLND and RBND locations, determined with Bayesian Model Averaging. 
Predictor/BIC/ R2/n All locations EMLR SEAST WLND RBND 
 P(inc) coeff ±SD P(inc) P(inc) coeff ±SD P(inc) P(inc) 
Intercept 
(Group entity, Both genders, 
Primary producer, EMLR location, 
Covenant)  
100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 






15.4 79.1  
-1.84±1.26 
59.6 15.1 
Gender of primary contact 
Female 
Male 




Resident or absentee 6.5  44.9 17.4  11.7 37.2 
Primary production status   
Non-primary producer 

















NA NA  NA NA 
Covenant status  
No covenant 





BIC -602.3  -151.9 -98.1  -76.3 -41.6 
R2 0.22  0.06 0.56  0.12 0.19 
n 157  53 42  32 21 
Pr(inc) probability of inclusion 
BIC Bayesian information criterion 
Coefficient and standard deviation shown only when Pr(inc) >75 % 
List of figures 
Fig. 1 BushBids project locations Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR), Woodland (WLND), 
Riverbend (RBND), Southern Mallee (SMLE) and South Eastern (SEAST) in South Australia, 
Australia. 
 
Fig. 2 Per cent of participants involved in primary production (unclassified indicated by UC) and 
(a) absentee or resident, (b) with an existing covenant and/or proposed covenant, (c) with an 
existing covenant, (d) with a proposed covenant. NB width of bar indicates proportion or per 
cent of participants in a given category, dark grey indicates ‘yes’ and light grey indicates ‘no’ for 
y-axis variables. 
 
Fig. 3 Characteristics of participant clusters identified with cluster analysis. (a) per cent of entity 
type (G=group, I=individual/family) within clusters, (b) per cent of absentee and resident 
landholders within clusters, (c) per cent of primary producers and non-primary producers within 
clusters, (d) per cent of participants with existing covenants, (e) per cent of primary contact 
gender (B=both genders, F=female, M=male), and (f) per cent of participants with proposed 
covenants. NB width of bar indicates proportion or per cent of participants in a given cluster. 
 
Fig. 4 Per cent of (a) absentee participants (Y=yes, N=no) and (b) participating groups 
(G=group, I=individual/family) in project locations (unlabelled bars are SMLE project location). 
NB width of bar indicates proportion or per cent of participants in each project location. 
 
Supplement 1 Management plan size (ln ha) showing mean ± standard error for (a) project 
location, (b) entity type (G=group, I=individual/family), (c) gender of primary contact (B=both 
genders, F=female, M=male), (d) primary production status (PP=primary producer, non-PP=non 
primary producer), (e) absentee status (Y=yes, N=no), (f) covenant status (Y=existing and/or 
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 Incentive participants in agricultural areas are generally framed as resident farming 
individuals 
 Empirical data from large conservation tender challenges this conceptualisation  
 Participants were diverse in land use, residence location and ownership structure 
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